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Abstract—The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an
application-layer control protocol used to establish and terminate
calls that are deployed globally. A flood of SIP INVITE packets
sent by an attacker causes a Telephony Denial of Service
(TDoS) incident, during which legitimate users are unable to use
telephony services. Legacy TDoS defense is typically implemented
as network appliances and not sufficiently deployed to enable
early detection. To make TDoS defense more widely deployed
and yet affordable, this paper presents TDoSD@DP where TDoS
detection and mitigation is programmed at the data plane so
that it can be enabled on every switch port and therefore serves
as distributed SIP sensors. With this approach, the damage is
isolated at a particular switch and bandwidth saved by not
sending attack packets further upstream. Experiments have been
performed to track the SIP state machine and to limit the number
of active SIP session per port. The results show that TDoSD@DP
was able to detect and mitigate ongoing INVITE flood attack,
protecting the SIP server, and limiting the damage to a local
switch. Bringing the TDoS defense function to the data plane
provides a novel data plane application that operates at the SIP
protocol and a novel approach for TDoS defense implementation.
Index Terms—SIP, DoS, DDoS, SDN, P4, data plane
I. INTRODUCTION
Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) attack has the potential
to disrupt telecommunication services denying legitimate users
access to the service. One common method of launching a
TDoS attack is by sending a flood of SIP INVITE packets to
a SIP server. This attack overwhelms the system and causes a
service disruption for legitimate users.
We review previous proposals in the literature from two
perspectives: the attack detection method and the defense
location. From the perspective of an attack detection method,
previous proposals can be broadly categorized into three types:
rule-based, anomaly-based and state machine-based. With
rule-based detection method, specific rules are followed that
are used to determine whether to make a pass or drop decision.
This rule can either be static or dynamic. For example, a
rule or signature can be constructed to raise the alarm when
certain characteristics are met [1] [2]. For anomaly-based
detection methods, a mathematical or statistical model is built
that describes proper behavior for a SIP session, and when
anomalies or significant deviations are detected, it raises the
alarm [4]. With state machine based detection methods, the
state machine for the SIP protocol is tracked and deviation
from the expected state transition will raise the alarm [5] [6].
From the defense location perspective, previous proposals
have been implemented either as a network-based IDS, a host-
based IDS, an extension module for the SIP server software,
or hybrid combination of these. With network-based IDS,
a dedicated server or network appliance is installed in the
network path between trusted and untrusted areas, either as
a transparent layer 2 device (as a bump-in-the-wire) or as a
layer 3 device. Being on the circuit, the appliance will be able
to see all packets that pass through the device [1] [2]. With
host-based IDS, this capability is implemented as detection
and mitigation software installed on the targeted server [4].
With the extension module, this capability is implemented as
an extension module of the SIP Proxy software [5] [6]. Com-
mercial DDoS defense solution is offered as a hybrid solution
between cloud-based scrubbing center in the provider’s data
center and DDoS appliance in the subscriber’s data center.
A. Motivation and use cases
As we enter the era of IoT and edge computing, distributed
devices produce a high volume of streaming data which
requires substantial bandwidth and computing resources to
perform attack detection and mitigation functions in the data
center. Due to the cost and practical constraints, the IDS/IPS
sensors are not sufficiently deployed for early detection. The
first motivation of this work is to enable TDoS defense
as widely as possible before TDoS packets had the chance
to accumulate and become disruptive to SIP service. Edge-
oriented defense approach is also proposed by [3], but this
paper is focused solely on SIP packets.
The second motivation is to address recent security trends
that expose the weaknesses of existing approach. These in-
clude for example, growing DDoS attack size (as demon-
strated by Mirai botnet attack at 1.1 Tbps [7]), Low-and-
slow application-layer DDoS attack [8], mobile botnets that
consists of infected mobile phones [9], DDoS attacks that were
launched from mobile phones against 911 emergency services
[10], the use of SIP for botnets communication [11], etc.
Given these new concerns and trends, defense methods
from previous proposals are still required, but it needs to978-1-5386-3416-5/18/$31.00 © 2018IEEE
Fig. 1. Locations where typical defense is implemented (1-3) vs. this paper
(4)
be implemented and deployed in more locations. Instead of
relying on legacy network appliances installed at data centers,
these recent security trends point to the need for detection and
mitigation capabilities to be deployed as widely as possible,
and placed as near as possible to the attacker. For practical
reasons, this approach should be cost-effective, support in-
cremental and non-contiguous deployment. As such, it is not
meant to replace existing defense systems, rather it is designed
to augment or complement.
B. Contribution
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Novel data plane application that operates at SIP proto-
col layer. To the best of our knowledge, data plane appli-
cations have never been applied to the DoS vulnerability
of the SIP protocol.
• Novel implementation of state-based SIP INVITE flood
attack detection. To the best of our knowledge, SIP IN-
VITE flood attack detection have never been implemented
at the data plane.
• Novel location for SIP INVITE flood attack detection and
mitigation. To the best of our knowledge, SIP TDoS
attack detection and mitigation have never been imple-
mented at every port on a network switch.
The rest of the paper is organized as below: the proposed
solution is outlined in section II, followed by section III that
describes the experiments. The result from experiments are
presented in section IV-A, discussion in section IV-B, followed
by current limitation in section IV-C. Finally, conclusion
remarks are drawn in section V.
II. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Data plane application for TDoS defense
SDN offers a new paradigm for networking with pro-
grammable control and data plane. This level of programma-
bility offers a new set of capabilities that were not previ-
Fig. 2. Typical SIP session establishment (RFC3665/BCP75)
ously available to SIP security researchers. Considering that
telephony is a time-sensitive application, it is necessary to
minimize delay when processing real-time packets. With that
requirement in mind, we propose to implement TDoS detection
and mitigation capability in the data plane directly. When the
data plane is programmable, it is now possible to perform deep
packet inspection at the SIP protocol layer for every single
packet. This function is necessary to verify whether or not a
particular SIP session deviates from normal SIP state machine
protocol. In essence, we propose to implement the functions
of a traditional network appliance in the data plane and to
make it available at every switch port. The contrast between
previous proposals and this paper is illustrated in Figure 1.
Each rectangles in Figure 1 depicts locations where TDoS
detection and mitigation are commonly implemented, i.e., as
an application installed on the same host as the SIP Proxy
Server, as an extension module of the SIP Proxy Server, and
as a dedicated network appliance, respectively. In contrast,
this proposal implements TDoS defense at the data plane as
depicted in Figure 1 (bottom rectangle). In this approach, SIP
TDoS defense can be made available on each port on P4
switch.
B. SIP state machine detection algorithm
The SIP protocol uses a state machine to create and ter-
minate a SIP session. A valid and proper SIP session will
consist of a pair of INVITE-and-BYE packet, whereas for a
Telephony DoS attack it will have high number of INVITE
packets. As per RFC 3665 or Best Current Practice 75 [12],
successful session establishment looks like Figure 2 where the
caller initiated the session by sending INVITE packet and the
callee ended the session by sending BYE packet.
As depicted with pseudo code in Figure 3, the attack
detection algorithm states that for every switch port, it cannot
exceed active session limit that has been pre-set for that port.
A SIP session is considered active when a port has received an
INVITE packet and BYE packet has not been sent out from the
Fig. 3. Pseudo code for detection & mitigation
TABLE I
CUSTOMIZABLE LIMIT FOR EACH PORT
Connected device Port# INVITE Limit
IP phone 1 1
IoT device 2 0
Computer 3 1
– – –
Trunk port 24 1000
same port. In other words, the algorithm can imposes a limit to
the outstanding INVITE packets. When this limit is reached,
subsequent INVITE packets will be automatically dropped and
a SIP session cannot be created.
During TDoS attack, the attacker keeps sending INVITE
packets without following interactions as specified in the
protocol specification RFC 3261 [13]. As such there will be a
lot of INVITE packets and this condition is interpreted as an
ongoing INVITE flood attack. In this situation, these INVITE
packets are automatically dropped at the data plane.
Tracking the SIP state-machine is effective because it still
works even when the source IP address is spoofed and random-
ized. To contrast with signature/rule-based detection method,
it is hard to build effective detection rules when the source IP
address is random. With the anomaly-based method, the low-
and-slow attack does not trigger the alarm because it does not
exhibit a different traffic pattern (e.g., sudden burst of traffic)
and therefore appears as normal traffic to the anomaly-based
algorithm. In contrast with the anomaly-based method, the
state-machine detection method still works regardless of how
slow or how fast these malicious SIP sessions were created.
C. Custom INVITE limit for each port
On a switch, each port has its own INVITE Limit depending
on which device is connected to that port and the potential
threat that this device is presenting (Table I). For example, the
limit can be set to zero for an IoT device that is not expected
Fig. 4. SIP INVITE & BYE counters at every port. Counters are reset after
completion of a valid session.
to have SIP communication. This is useful to prevent an IoT
device that has been infected and recruited by a botnets to use
SIP as a command and control (C2) channel [11]. If the port
is authorized for SIP sessions, the limit for this port can be
set to one or two depending on the requirement. If this port is
connected to an upstream SIP provider, then its Outstanding
INVITE Limit can have a larger value.
When an INVITE packet was received by port 1, the value
of INVITE register at port 1 was increased by 1 as depicted
in Figure 4 step (1). Subsequent INVITE packets that were
received by port 1 were automatically dropped since the
Outstanding INVITE Limit for port 1 (connected to an IP
phone) was pre-set to 1 (Table I). Non SIP packets were
processed as normal, i.e., were routed towards the destination.
When a BYE packet was about to be sent out of port 1,
the value of the BYE register at port 1 was increased by 1
as depicted in Figure 4 step (2). At this time both registers
(INVITE and BYE) had the value of one that signifies a
completed SIP session. These registers were reset to 0 as in
Figure 4 step (3) at the end of a complete session.
III. EXPERIMENTS
A. Three scenarios
To contrast the different outcome between a legacy switch
and TDoSD@DP under TDoS attack situation, three scenarios
were tested as depicted in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Comparing the outcome between legacy vs. P4 switch, with and without TDoS attack.
• Scenario 1: Legacy switch, no attack. This scenario is
taken as the baseline for comparison. H3 (extension 100)
is calling H5 (extension 101) once per second for three
consecutive minutes (a total of 180 total calls).
• Scenario 2: Legacy switch, under TDoS attack. TDoS
attack was introduced after 60 seconds into the session.
An attacker at switch 2 sent 10 million SIP INVITE
packets to the SIP Proxy (which is more than enough
to cause process stack overflow, i.e., 110 packets/second
[14]). This scenario shows the impact of TDoS attack on
the victim (SIP Proxy) and on the switch that is directly
connected to the attacker.
• Scenario 3: TDoSD@DP, under TDoS attack. The same
attack scenario as Scenario 2, but legacy switches were
replaced by P4 switches that run TDoSD@DP data plane
application. This scenario shows how TDoSD@DP solves
the problem presented in Scenario 2.
B. Test environment
The experiment was conducted using mininet to build
topology in Figure.5 to emulate a typical SIP environment.
This emulated environment consists of 3 switches, 1 SIP Proxy
server, 2 SIP phones (H3 and H5), and an attacker (H4).
The SIP Proxy server was connected to switch 1, the caller
(extension 100) and the attacker was connected to switch 2,
while the callee (extension 101) was connected to switch 3.
Two kinds of switches were used for comparison purposes
(Open vSwitch to represent the legacy switch and bmv2 to
run TDoSD@DP data plane application). For the SIP Proxy
server, a popular open source Asterisk software was used. For
SIP phones (extension 100 and 101), an open source SIP traffic
generator called SIPp was used. For the attacker, a real TDoS
tool called inviteflood [15] was used.
C. P4 program implementation
The data plane application for the SIP TDoS defense was
written with the P4 14 programming language [16] and ran on
the bmv2 switch. A SIP header was defined with one field,
i.e. startline, with the size of 64 bits which is sufficient to
identify whether it contains an INVITE or a BYE packet.
Four registers were defined: INVITE, INVITE limit, BYE,
and BYE limit. These registers were used to hold the total
number of INVITE and BYE packets coming from/to a
specific port and their associated limits. Ingress and Egress
port number metadata is used to access these registeres. Two
tables were used: checkINVITE table that was used during
ingress, and checkBYE table was used during egress. The
match for checkINVITE table was based on two fields, i.e.,
ingress port number and SIP startline, whereas the match for
checkBYE table was also based on two fields, i.e., egress port
number and SIP startline. To get a match for a SIP INVITE
packet on the checkINVITE table, it was pre-populated with
ingress port number and hex value for SIP INVITE, e.g., 1,
0x0x494e564954452073 (to match SIP INVITE packet
arrived at Port 1) and its associated action was to increment
the INVITE counter. In order to get a match for SIP BYE
packet, the table was pre-populated with egress port number
and hex value for BYE e.g. 1, 0x425945207369703a
and its associated default action to increment the BYE counter.
With the above functions, the data plane was able to track the
number of SIP INVITE packets received by each port, as well
as SIP BYE packets sent by each port. For IPv4 routing and
switching, longest prefix match on destination IP address and
setting destination MAC address was performed, similar to P4
simple router program.
Fig. 6. Comparison of CPU & Memory utilization for SIP Proxy & SW2 between 3 scenarios. Workload is shifted to the attacker’s P4 switch (SW2) instead
of on the SIP Proxy server.
TABLE II
RESULTS
Scenario.1
Non-programmable Data Plane.
No attack
Scenario.2
Non-programmable Data Plane.
With TDoS attack
Scenario.3
Programmable Data Plane.
With TDoS attack
Virtual switch software Open vSwitch Open vSwitch bmv2
Attack packets sent by attacker None 10,000,000 10,000,000
Attack packets received by server 0 10,000,000 1
Attack packets dropped by switch 0 0 9,999,999
Server (victim) error message None Unable to create socket None
Server (victim) max CPU % 2 120.5 2
Server (victim) max MEM % 0.9 11.4 0.9
Switch (defense) max CPU % 0 0 98.6
Switch (defense) max MEM % 0.1 0.1 1.3
Number of calls attempted 180 67 180
Number of successful call 180 63 180
D. Normal call emulation
To emulate a normal call, extension 100 (H3) was calling
extension 101 (H5) by sending INVITE packets to the SIP
Proxy Server. The SIP Proxy server recognized that the call
was meant for extension 101, and created a second SIP session
to extension 101. Extension 101 answered the call and then
terminated the call by sending a BYE packet towards the SIP
Proxy server, which then terminated the call to extension 100.
It took less than 1 second to establish and terminate a call.
E. TDoS attack emulation
A TDoS attack was initiated 60 seconds after a normal call
was initiated. Using the inviteflood tool, the attacker (H4) sent
10 million SIP INVITE packets to the SIP Proxy server.
IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Result
The result from the 3 experiments is given in Table II. A
total of 180 calls were made in all experiments. During the
TDoS attack, the legacy switch passed all 10,000,000 attack
packets to their destination, whereas the TDoSD@DP only
let the first INVITE packet to pass through and dropped the
remaining packets (9,999,999).
With the legacy switch, the SIP Proxy server received 10
million attack packets and generated an error message saying
unable to create sockets. This corresponds to the low number
of successful call attempt (63) reported by the caller (H3,
extension 100). The SIP Proxy server stopped working as it
ran out of internal resources. Whereas with TDoSD@DP, the
SIP Proxy server did not generate any error message and was
able to keep serving clients as normal. This condition was
captured by the number of successful calls reported by H3,
which was 180 (1 call per second for 3 minutes).
Next we compare the system utilization of the three sce-
narios. The top row in Figure 6 depicts CPU and memory
utilization for the SIP Proxy server, and the bottom row depicts
CPU and memory utilization of the switch that is directly
connected to the attacker.
• Scenario 1: Legacy switch, no attack. CPU utilization of
the SIP Proxy server was hovering around 1 % for most
of the time, whereas memory was around 0.9 %.
• Scenario 2: Legacy switch, under TDoS attack. CPU
utilization of the SIP Proxy server shot up to 120.5 %
(multicores server, which used the second core for ad-
ditional processing capacity). The memory was hovering
around 11.4 %. This was the time when the SIP Proxy
server stopped processing calls as it ran out of internal
resources to create sockets.
• Scenario 3: TDoSD@DP, under TDoS attack. The SIP
Proxy did not experience performance hit. It shows
similar CPU and memory usage pattern as the baseline.
Instead of being processed by the SIP Proxy Server, the
processing workload (attack detection and mitigation) has
shifted to the TDoSD@DP. At one point, the maximum
CPU utilization reached 98.6 %.
B. Discussion
The main difference between the three experiments was the
type of switch being used. With the legacy switch, it simply
delivered the packets towards the destination and was not even
aware that the packets were part of an ongoing TDoS attack. In
contrast, TDoSD@DP was able to do deep packet inspection
at SIP layer, dropped attack packets and let legitimate packets
to pass through. A period of high CPU load on the bmv2
switch is expected due to processing the malicious packets.
In enterprise or service provider environments, dedicated
network appliances usually perform deep packet inspection for
SIP traffic. This capability is typically available in a centralized
scrubbing center or data center. However, it is costly to deploy
these appliances widely, and it is inefficient to transport TDoS
packets from multiple remote locations to the central data
center, where it is eventually dropped.
With TDoSD@DP, SIP flood defense can be performed as
soon as the attack packets entered the network and did not have
to wait until it reaches the central data center. This approach
has the advantages of mitigating the attack closest to the source
of the attack. The detection and mitigation algorithm is kept
simple considering limited computing resources available on
access layer switch.
As for concerns about performance, two considerations
might address these. First, since TDoSDD@DP is dealing with
SIP DoS attack at the network edge, the size of attack traffic
is considerably small and manageable for a modern switch
to handle. Second, the underlying target platform (e.g., NIC,
NPU, ASIC, etc.) is getting faster. For example, Netronome
Agilio NIC can run at 40 Gbps, while Tofino chips can run at
6.5 Tbps.
For the recent attack use cases, TDoSD@DP is capable
of dealing with various SIP TDoS attacks. For example, in
Distributed TDoS attacks where IoT devices were used to
launch SIP DoS attack, the INVITE limit can be set to zero,
so IoT device will not be able to send INVITE packet. With
the low-and-slow SIP DoS attack, TDoSD@DP limits the total
number of SIP session allowed, regardless of how slow or how
fast the sessions were created.
C. Limitation
With the current state of bmv2 implementation, TDoS
detection and mitigation capability are limited to unencrypted
packets. Detection also limited to the first eight bytes of SIP
packet as P4 14 and bmv2 does not currently support multiple
variable-length fields which is typical for SIP headers. As
consequences, it prevents TDoSD@DP to reach granularity at
individual SIP branch e.g., CSeq, Call-ID, and remote/local-
tag level.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes Telephony Denial of Service Defense at
the Data Plane (TDoSD@DP), a novel data plane application
that operates at the SIP protocol layer and a novel implemen-
tation of SIP DDoS defense. The experiments showed that
TDoSD@DP was able to detect and mitigate ongoing SIP
INVITE flood attack. TDoSD@DP provides network operators
with granular control of SIP INVITE at every switch port and
enables them to spread SIP DoS defense capability throughout
the network rather than solely relying on legacy DoS defense
appliances that are installed in regional or global data center.
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